Abstract
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will optimize the utility of available information and produce shared battlespace awareness. It is apparent that for DoD to bring the concept of NCW to fruition, it needs to combine various military assets to perform the function of turning all types of raw information into useable intelligence. To accomplish this, it will be necessary to establish a framework of joint multisource analysis and reporting centers to optimize the utility of information.
The backbone of this architecture would be to establish a system of interconnected ground stations that would perform the processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PEDs) functions on information collected by a multitude of sensors. Using a robust C4 architecture, these ground stations would feed off globally deployed sensors and could dynamically support different theaters/CINCs, depending on daily priorities/tasking. For the purposes of this paper, the arbitrary designation Joint Intelligence Ground System (JIGS) fulfills this vision. Through multi-service implementation of the JIGS concept, a new dimension of intelligence integration and interoperability will be realized. More importantly, combining service specific capabilities and leveraging modern information technologies to collect, analyze, fuse and rapidly disseminate intelligence at the operational level will lay the much needed foundation for NCW.
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Background
The world is undergoing an information revolution with the rapid advancement in information technologies. This revolutionary change encompasses increasing military dependencies on information at all levels of war. The May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review details information superiority as a key component for transforming U.S. forces in the future. It describes information superiority as the backbone of military invention.
"The ongoing transformation of our military capabilities -the so called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) -centers on developing the improved information and command and control capabilities needed to significantly enhance joint operations. With the support of an advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) backbone, the United States will be able to respond rapidly to any conflict; warfighters will be able to dominate any situation; and, day-to-day operations will be optimized with accurate, timely, and secure information. Just as much of the non-defense world has become increasingly interconnected through the growth of inter-netted communications, the DoD is working to provide a complementary, secure, open C4ISR network architecture." 1 Undoubtedly, information operations is becoming more dynamic and essential to daily activities of the United States (US) military services. This includes capitalizing on the power of information to ultimately fight and win the nation's wars. In the Gulf War, US and allied forces brought to the battlefield a new degree of flexibility, synchronization, speed and precision by leveraging information. 2 Battlefield advantages gained through C4ISR capabilities in Operation ALLIED FORCE also exemplified an increased relevance of information. 3 In the future, the reliance on robust information architectures to support and execute military operations will only continue to grow in importance.
Within the Department of Defense (DoD) many concepts have evolved which formulate utilizing the virtual information domain to support operations in the traditional physical domains of land, sea, air and space. One such concept, Network Centric Warfare (NCW), defines and describes how the US military should organize and fight in the information age. NCW is defined as "an information-superiority concept of operations that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization." 4 In essence, the concept of NCW is designed to translate information superiority into enhanced military might. Information superiority means trying to know everything about an adversary while keeping the adversary from knowing much about oneself. It means turning the "balance of information and knowledge" in one's favor, especially if the balance of forces is not. It means using knowledge so that less capital and labor may have to be expended. This form of warfare may involve diverse technologies, notably for command and control, for intelligence collection, processing and distribution, for tactical communications, positioning, identifying friend-or-foe, and for "smart" weapons systems. 5 This paper will explore why and conceptualize how a jointly integrated, global intelligence architecture will be paramount in order for NCW to fully optimize its potential for operational commanders. Specifically, my research will address why a fourth grid, the intelligence analysis grid, should be an inherent part of the NCW construct, and that the military services should team to rapidly Process, Exploit, and Disseminate (commonly known as PEDs within the DoD community) operational intelligence within the concept of NCW-based operations.
Introduction and Thesis
With more than 20 years of service in the US intelligence community, my experience and knowledge has led me to the conclusion that DoD should build a jointly integrated, global architecture, utilizing state-of-the-art information technologies to process, analyze, and disseminate operational intelligence to the warfighter. The backbone of this architecture would be to establish a system of interconnected ground stations that would perform the PEDs functions on information collected by a multitude of sensors. Using a robust C4 architecture, these ground stations would feed off globally deployed sensors and could dynamically support different theaters/CINCs, depending on daily priorities/tasking. For the purposes of this paper, the arbitrary designation Joint Intelligence Ground System (JIGS) fulfills this vision.
The DoD has worked hard to build a joint architecture to integrate service resources for the purposes of intelligence collection, processing, exploitation, production, and dissemination at the strategic level. These joint organizations include functionally aligned agencies (Defense Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, National will be rapidly moved between geographically separated locations to perform the PEDs functions.
In rapid succession, a vast array of intelligence products such as voice reports, textual reports, soft/hard images, graphical displays will be provided to the operational commanders/warfighters.
Through multi-service implementation of the JIGS concept, a new dimension of intelligence integration and interoperability will be realized. More importantly, combining service specific capabilities and leveraging modern information technologies to collect, analyze, fuse and rapidly disseminate intelligence at the operational level will lay the much needed foundation for NCW.
Operational Warfare…The Need For Jointness
Professor Milan Vego, defines operational warfare as, "Practical application of operational art in planning, preparing, and conducting fundamental warfare areas on land, sea, and airspace." With the advent of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, a renewed focus on joint doctrine has been incorporated into all DoD components. Joint Vision 2020 states, "The primary purpose of military forces has been and will be to fight and win the Nation's wars." The overall goal of joint strategy is the creation of a combined/integrated force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations. Success in countering dynamic threats will require the skillful integration of all military instruments of power into a joint force tailored to the specific situation and objectives. The joint force, because of its flexibility and responsiveness, will remain the key to operational success in the future. Strategic goals will be achieved through "full spectrum dominance" -the ability of US forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations. 11 The integration of core competencies, to include intelligence assets, provided by the individual Services is essential to the joint team effort. The JIGS concept will fill the void currently existing at the operational-tactical level. The existing JICs and JAC do not perform the first-phase PEDs functions on information collected from the current suite of DoD sensors; they primarily function to perform second-and third-phase intelligence analysis and production. A fully integrated, interoperable JIGS architecture will be a key component to realizing the vision of NCW at the operational level of war.
Basic Background on Intelligence
Intelligence is defined as "The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas" or "Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding." 12 Intelligence is more than basic information. It is knowledge that is prepared against a specific target whether geographic, material, or human for a specific customer/consumer. The very word knowledge highlights the need for human involvement to turn raw information into intelligence. Intelligence sources and methods are manifested in several forms often referred to as specific intelligence disciplines. These are Human analyze, and disseminate data generated by independent airborne and national collection sensors.
In general, older generations of ground stations were developed by a single service for a single collection platform, and commonly a single discipline sensor suite. Affiliated ground stations were designed specifically to support an individual collection platform which often carried a Single-INT sensor suite. These ground stations were also accomplishing certain specialized functions of interest to that service. The uniqueness of these ground stations often resulted in some significant problems. For example:
• Data could not be shared with other services due to specialized formats.
• Remote access of imagery and products and remote exploitation capability was very limited.
• The ground station for one suite of sensors could not process raw data from another suite of sensors.
• Economies of scale could not be realized. Ground station capabilities that were functionally similar were being developed independently without common technical and architectural objectives.
• Multiple stand-alone communications architectures were required to enable these ground stations to operate.
• System uniqueness presented training problems that caused analysts and maintainers to learn to operate and maintain different systems. 15 Traditionally separate intelligence disciplines and/or platform-specific data were collected, processed, exploited, and disseminated individually, usually by a single agency or service. In basic terms, very rarely was multi-INT or all-source analysis/fusion immediately performed at the operational level. "When service requirements converge-such as reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities-interservice capability is desirable. This reduces research and development and acquisition costs, facilitates communication and information exchange, and simplifies command and control challenges." 16 Many DoD initiatives are attempting to improve interoperability and information sharing across the intelligence disciplines. One such initiative that is building on information age capabilities is the concept of NCW.
Concept of Network Centric Warfare
NCW is a concept that is still evolving. 
Figure 1. Network Centric Warfare is missing an Intelligence Analysis Grid
NCW promises several advantages over the current so-called platform-centric concept employed today. Speed of command and self-synchronization together promise to shift the focus of warfare from enemy attrition to one in which high operations tempos and rates of change will lock-out enemy alternatives while locking-in blue force successes. In doing so, the NCW concept can potentially "offset a disadvantage in numbers, technology, or position." 18 Achieving the goals of NCW will require three key enablers: responsive information collection, processing and dissemination; exploitation of technical innovations; interoperability and single, integrated C3
architecture." 19 The overriding goal of the JIGS concept is to incorporate these enablers into a single ISR package. The purpose of the JIGS-type architecture would be to optimize the ability to conduct information-based warfare while institutionalizing the concepts of NCW. Both fixed and deployable components which are networked to provide near real-time (NRT) information processing, exploitation, reporting and dissemination of intelligence products to operational consumers worldwide will be incorporated. The JIGS can best be described as a physical and virtual consolidation of multi-service intelligence ground system resources at core and contingency locations. These material and human resources will be used to complete the needed exploitation of multi-INT intelligence provided by national satellites, commercial satellites, U-2, 
JIGS Core Locations
The fixed-location hubs should be designed/built as a modular, scaleable, intelligence ground station which will satisfy time-critical unit, theater and national intelligence requirements in peace, crisis, and war. Multiple force employment options are provided that are interoperable with other DoD PEDs components for use across the entire spectrum of conflict. The use of off-the-shelf technologies would reduce operational employment/sustainment costs and provide opportunities for quality force improvements to the intelligence force.
As a baseline capability, the JIGS would consist of four fixed ground stations located at core geographic locations (Langley AFB, VA, Beale AFB, CA, Pacific Theater, and European Theater). 25 These fixed/core JIGS locations leverage Air Force investment in the Distributed
Common Ground System which is currently under development. JIGS core locations would be interconnected and have virtual access to all other components of the overall DoD intelligence system. Both operational and tactical control (OPCON/TACON) of the JIGS would fluctuate depending on evolving intelligence needs and established priorities. For instance, the CONUSbased JIGS location in California might support a U-2 mission over the Balkans during the day, a GLOBAL HAWK UAV mission against China later that night, and a Predator UAV mission in South America the next day or depending on capacity, perhaps all three simultaneously. 
JIGS Concept of Operations
Soldiers, sailors, marines, and airman have differing perspectives of the battlespace. It is not the aim of the JIGS concept to eliminate those perspectives, but rather to draw on their unique qualities to provide a synergistic, highly integrated, and seamless intelligence mechanism. 
Dynamic Platform/Sensor Retasking
Because multi-INT analysts are interconnected within JIGS, they would be able to provide tipoffs and cross-cueing of data. A collaborative effort between multi-INT analysts will ensure that the use of all available platforms/sensors is optimized. For instance, an ELINT tip-off of threat activity will allow imagery analysts to steer available collection assets to get a picture and correlate, fuse, and report the specific activity. Using DoD software collaboration tools, JIGS analysts will also be able to share and receive data from other intelligence sources such as mission Integrated Air Defense System (IADS), and whenever detected active, to provide instantaneous warning over theater threat networks. In addition, SA will be enhanced through graphical reporting. JIGS analysts will accomplish this by updating the current DoD common operating picture system with real-time updates of known enemy order of battles. These data points will contain all known parameters such as type, location, heading, speed, etc., of specific targets.
When coupled with all DoD sources of intelligence this reporting system will give operation entities a real-time graphical display of all known red force dispositions.
Flexible Targeting
One of the biggest lessons learned from the Gulf War and the recent operation against Serbia was the need to enhance our capability of locating and targeting mobile targets. This goal was
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further exacerbated by enemy camouflage, concealment, and deception techniques. 29 There is a need for a multifaceted approach to overcome the asymmetric peril posed by mobile threats.
"Rapid, effective operations to destroy or neutralize critical mobile air, surface, subsurface, and space targets, are essential to the success of future joint operations." 30 The JIGS will provide an integrated and responsive capability to help detect, locate, identify, track, and engage mobile targets. This will be accomplished by rapidly correlating available data from different platforms and sensors, both at the core location and through collaborative tools.
Precision Engagement
"Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) depend on precise intelligence…analysts must combine disparate data from all collection sources and give it to the decision maker within a definite 
Combat Search and Rescue
The Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) missions for the downed F-117 and F-16 pilots during Operation ALLIED FORCE were among the most complex and dangerous missions US forces undertook. 36 During future CSAR operations, unmanned (expendable) ISR platforms could fly over hostile territory and feed the JIGS with multi-source locational data with a more tolerable risk of being shot down. The JIGS analysts would monitor the situation using best available platforms/sensors and provide second-by-second information to rescue teams, theater commanders and national level decision-makers. Using UAVs and established communication links, the JIGS would enhance the situational awareness and overall ability to safely recover downed pilots.
JIGS Scenario: Network Centric Warfare In-Action
A typical JIGS scenario would evolve as follows: The first indication of a mobile SAM threat comes from a SIGINT sensor on the U-2 which is downlinked to the core JIGS location. JIGS ELINT analysts quickly analyze the emissions; they identify it as an SA-6 FLAT FACE radar and within seconds broadcast a threat warning via theater threat nets (AWACs would rebroadcast to all coalition assets). The ELINT analysts then correlate the intercepted signal with an overhead mission ground station which has also collected the same FLAT FACE signal. By synthesizing two different ELINT intercepts, a refined direction finding (DF) coordinate is calculated. This DF coordinate and all known system parameters (type, capability, etc) are quickly entered into the common operating picture database and will be graphically displayed at all user locations.
Simultaneously this locational data is passed to JIGS ISR mission managers who in-turn task the nearest available IRS platform/sensor, a GLOBAL HAWK UAV to take an EO image of those Although this scenario is at the tactical level of war, it represents a new paradigm of information-based warfare which embodies the concepts of NCW and has significant operationallevel implications. Unfortunately, without a JIGS-type construct, the scenario above can only be partially realized. It is imperative for DoD to build the first-phase intelligence architecture necessary to make the vision of accomplishing time-critical targeting a reality. Military operations in the 21 st century will be conducted in an information-rich environment.
Conclusion
For information superiority to be realized, huge amounts of "data" must be concurrently collected, processed, and fused into "intelligence" via high capacity networks that link a joint intelligence ground system architecture. Information superiority will be achieved when timely, accurate knowledge is delivered anywhere on the battlefield from around the globe at a more rapid pace than the opponent's decision cycle. Several DoD efforts are underway to build the family of sensors needed to support the variety of service shooters. However, raw data/information collected by sensors must be analyzed and correlated into useable intelligence in order to be fully relevant for shooters. At the operational-tactical levels, a JIGS-like architecture will help to breakdown and eliminate intelligence stovepipes. By leveraging technology, JIGS will also achieve an economy of force for precious intelligence resources of the military services. Most importantly, JIGS will facilitate the timeliness and utility of theater intelligence…ensuring products get to the right consumer, with the right focus, at the right time. In short, a combined effort to collect, exploit, and disseminate operational intelligence will optimize the concept of NCW, thereby supporting the full spectrum of military operations…from operations other than war to a major theater war.
To fully capitalize on the information revolution we must invest our resources wisely to maintain information superiority. We cannot afford to be caught by surprise. The time to lay the intelligence foundation to conduct NCW is now. Recommend DoD build an operational-level JIGS architecture to optimize available resources and ensure the US remains the World's leader in conducting information-based warfare.
